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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the 
Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to 
carry out research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and 
vulnerability is exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms 
one element in a broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide 
the full documentation of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not 
confirmed. It also aims to analyse the processes through which such impacts occur 
and the circumstances which exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a 
practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and policy 
recommendations to donor government agencies. 
 
This report on Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies 
can be found at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This report is the result of an 11-day visit 
to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in September 2004. Wider research and information were 
used to complement the stakeholder interviews held during this period. The authors 
would like to thank Julia Buxton and William Godnick for comments on an earlier 
draft. The analysis and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent the views or policy of DFID or the UK government. 
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This report is the result of an 11-day visit to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in September 
2004. Wider research and information were used to complement the stakeholder 
interviews held during this period. The objectives of the study were to: 
• Contribute to the UK Government Department for International Development- 
(DFID) funded Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) global research 
study on the links between armed violence and poverty.  
• Contribute to the AVPI global study on assessing and reviewing the impact of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) projects on small arms availability/misuse 
and poverty. 
• Support the case study organisation (Viva Rio) with its internal reflection on 
strategy and impact.   
 
Causes of violence in Rio de Janeiro are multi-faceted. High levels of inequality and 
physical, social and economic exclusion from the formal system are some of the 
principle causes. This combines with cultural factors such as machismo and the draw 
of perceived higher social status and identity through joining gangs. The availability 
of guns, cocaine and the marijuana industry exacerbates the problem. The lack of an 
integrated public security strategy coupled with a violent and corrupt police, and a 
judiciary and prison system which is ineffective, are also contributing factors. The 
political and economic history of Brazil has played a part: the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy; rapid and unplanned urbanization; and shifts in labour 
market requirements to higher skill levels to meet new demands, resulting in high 
unemployment and frustration felt by those with some education but insufficient to 
secure a job in the formal economy. 
 
Perpetrators and victims of armed violence in Rio de Janeiro are primarily the 
police, drug traffickers (mainly young men of 14-29 years old), and civilians caught in 
the crossfire. Favelas1 are the main locations of gun violence but criminal violence 
does occur in other parts of the city. The principle type of armed violence is 
organised drug gang fighting for territorial control; police use of arms; armed robbery 
and petty crime. 
 
The selection of Rio as a case study was in part due to the existence of a well known 
and respected Non-Governmental Organisation in the fight against armed violence - 
Viva Rio. Founded in 1993 in response to gun violence in the city of Rio, its overall 
goal is to build a culture of peace by reducing gun violence and building social 
inclusion. It has a holistic approach which includes working at local (community), 
municipal, state and Federal levels. It also plays a role in the MERCOSUR2 region. 
The use of the media has been an integral part of its strategy. The target groups are: 
• 14-29 olds (mainly men) living in favelas.  
• Police. 
• Federal and state judiciary. 
• Wider society. 
                                                
1 A favela  is defined by  Rio city government’s complementary law no. 16 of 1992, as:  “A predominantly 
residential area, characterized by occupation of the land by low-income populations, precariousness of urban 
infrastructure and public services, narrow and irregularly aligned roads or passage-ways, plots of irregular form 
and size, and unlicensed constructions that do not conform to legal standards”. 
2 Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and 
the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. 
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One objective of this research was to highlight either existing or possible future 
indicators for monitoring and measuring the links between armed violence and 
poverty, and the ways in which an organisation or project could design an intervention 
to address these issues in an holistic manner. The following indicators were seen as 
particularly important (where they are being measured, the results are given in 
brackets):  
• Degree of public support for civilians not carrying guns (To be tested through a 
national Referendum in 2005). 
• Numbers of guns collected (120,000 from July to September 2004). 
• Changes in level of trust between police and community (demonstrated through 
respondents of the community policing programme  (GPAE) (Could be monitored 
in more depth in the future). 
• Use of violence by police reduced (To be tested through the GPAE). 
• Favela organisations able to continue projects without Viva Rio’s ongoing 
presence 
• Attitudinal change of individuals of target age and wider society in relation to gun 
possession and misuse, building a culture of peace, social responsibility, socio-
economic mobility not through drug gangs. 
• Change in degree of socio-economic inclusion. 
• Degree of interaction between programmes (either within or outside Viva Rio) 
addressing the multi-faceted nature of armed violence, its causes, perpetrators and 
victims. 
 
Sustainability and impact of Viva Rio’s programmes 
• Strong on ensuring financial sustainability and ability to mainstream projects into 
the state system. 
• Could be stronger in relation to strengthening local community organisations and 
empowerment. 
• Impacts: raising awareness around danger of guns. 
• Effective in removal of ‘surplus’ guns from society, although not necessarily those 
currently being used in armed violence. 
• Demonstration of partnership with the state. 
• Pilot initiatives in social inclusion and police reform, some of which have been 
mainstreamed by the state (e.g. telecurso). 
 
Key success factors of Viva Rio: 
• Community projects are located within favelas. 
• Staff within projects are largely from the same community. 
• Political buy-in. 
• Sophisticated Communications Campaign: use of communications for raising 
awareness, embedding media organisations within Viva Rio. 
• Piloting initiatives which are suitable for state mainstreaming. 
• Put in place databases to build statistical data and evidence to support projects and 
campaigns. 
• Use of research to ensure that the context and risk and protection factors are fully 
understood in order to focus policy and interventions. 
• Using communication to establish links across isolated community groups in 
conflict (e.g. Via Favela). 
• Developed partnerships with the state. 
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• Diverse funding sources have been a successful strategy as Brazilian sources have 
become relatively less important compared to international sources over the last 
few years. 
• Partnership with local and international business. 
• Wide network of high level contacts within and outside Brazil. 
 
Challenges faced by Viva Rio which could be relevant to other organisations if 
they are looking to adopt a holistic approach: 
• In spite of the difficult situation in favelas due to control by the drug factions, 
more emphasis could be placed on building on existing community structures and 
empowering partners at local level. 
• Although Viva Rio has a holistic approach to addressing violence, it is still 
“projectized” within the organisation. This means that some projects have little 
understanding of how they fit with other projects being implemented by VR and 
others in achieving the overall goal. It will therefore be important to build space 
for greater internal communication and reflection (this is partly being addressed 
through the design of a Human Security Centre due to open in 2005, and through 
monthly meetings of team coordinators). 
• The evaluation of impact is currently weak, partly due to lack of resources. This is 
in the process of being strengthened with wider surveys of impact due to be 
commissioned. However, the often non-attributable nature of impacts to any one 
situation, project or organisation combined with the small-scale of some of the 
community interventions makes this a particularly challenging element but a vital 
part of any organisational strategy that seeks to address complex social issues such 
as the reduction of violence. 
 
Conclusions in relation to armed violence and poverty / social exclusion in Rio: 
• Rio is one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil. However the extreme inequality and 
social exclusion of a significant proportion of the population stands out as one of 
the major fault lines and a cause of violence. 
• The presence of firearms, especially amongst drug traffickers in favelas is the 
biggest cause of firearm homicide.  
• The residents of favelas are stigmatized both in terms of location of residence and 
colour.  
• The favelas are illegal settlements which have made the state largely ignore them 
as areas of the city. This lack of state presence has made them more susceptible to 
the de facto control by drug factions, which in turn makes it harder for 
development to take place and limits outsiders entering, whether these are 
businesses or development/violence control or prevention projects.  
• In terms of income, the residents of favelas are not necessarily below the poverty 
line. However their relative poverty lies in their vulnerability and social exclusion.  
• In 1995 the city of Rio spent 5 per cent of GDP on combating violence (excluding 
private security).  
• The most relevant MDG in relation to Rio is education (63 per cent of favela 
residents in the Municipality of Rio have not achieved a primary certificate – i.e. 
less than 8 years of education).  
• The culture of machismo creates a climate in which violence is seen as a norm, 
contributing to incidents of violence. This is evident in the prevalence of domestic 
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violence against women and men’s desire to join drug gangs, seeing guns as a 
source of power and identity.  
• Favelas are often built on environmentally protected land, which used to be 
forests. They are characteristically on steep slopes above the city, which makes 
them vulnerable to mud slides in heavy rain.  This adds to the legislative difficulty 
of granting the land to the residents legally.  
• Partnerships for development need to be built in the context of Brazil and Rio. 
Partnerships need to be built with the multiple public security forces, which do not 
have an integrated policy to combat violence.   
 
Conclusions pertaining to Viva Rio (VR) in relation to the links between poverty/ 
social exclusion and violence: 
• VR articulates well the links between reducing violence and increasing social 
inclusion and is trying to address both in practice. The levels of intervention are at 
community/favela and municipal, state and federal levels. They are also 
researching these issues in Brazil and other MERCOSUR countries together with 
other partners.   
• VR has shown the importance of understanding the complex reality of these 
interlinked phenomena and the need to address them holistically. However not 
every project needs to address both issues.  
 
Conclusions on the differences and common ground between development and 
small arms specialists: 
• Small arms research and SALW intervention projects often focus on the weapon 
as the entry point, whereas development practitioners tend to focus on people as 
the entry point. This contributes to the current gap between these two groups. The 
Rio and Viva Rio case study has shown that by focusing on both the weapon and 
those most affected by its misuse, thereby with the emphasis on people, this 
allows for greater opportunity for dialogues and partnership between SALW 
control and development practitioners in the more effective pursuit of the same 
outcomes.  
• These differences currently have implications for how the categorisation of 
comparable contexts occurs.  
 
Recommendations to AVPI: 
• Define clearly the types of armed violence which the case studies are addressing 
(i.e. urban violence; post-conflict violence and reintegration; etc) 
• This research project demonstrated the importance of understanding the broad 
contextual links between armed violence and poverty in order to more effectively 
assess the impact of SALW intervention projects. As a result of effectively 
combining these two dimensions of the AVPI global research project (as was done 
in the case of Rio), the recommendation is then to integrate these two dimensions 
in the final synthesis report.  
• A holistic approach is recommended in order to identify the root causes of poverty 
and violence, who are the victims and perpetrators of armed violence and why. 
Only then is it possible to see which project interventions are most relevant, and 
for which purpose. 
• Use of language and definitions is vital to clarify in the introduction to the 
synthesis of findings. If poverty is seen as synonymous with inequality and 
Armed violence and poverty in Rio de Janeiro, Richardson & Kirsten, March 2005 
 8
exclusion then urban violence is one of the dimensions of poverty. If it is seen 
purely in absolute and not relative terms, and from an income measure then it is 
not possible to conclude that violence arises from poverty. However the poor, 
without coping mechanisms, are often worse affected by violence - economic, 
social, intimidation and fear – than those who can afford to protect themselves e.g. 
by hiring private security. The police are often more abusive to the poor as they 
have the least power to defend themselves. 
• There is a wealth of comparative research in relation to urban violence from a 
development perspective.  
• Using this research and the other relevant studies on this issue, next steps should 
be to develop context specific case studies of good practice. Stronger evaluation of 
impact within projects would help to determine what strategies or combination of 
strategic interventions are most effective.  
 
Recommendations to government and donor policy makers: 
• There needs to be an integration of small arms reduction and development 
specialists, policy makers and practitioners. This can be done by understanding 
each others’ perspectives and starting from the common ground of analysing who 
is most affected by both poverty and armed violence.  
• There is a wealth of information on each issue which this research has contributed 
to. However, meetings between these two groups should be a pre-requisite if 
development in areas of high armed violence is an objective.  
 
 




1.1 Objectives of the study 
 
• Contribute to the UK Government Department for International Development- 
(DFID) funded Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) global research 
study on the links between armed violence and poverty, especially the impact 
of armed violence on poverty.  
• Contribute to the AVPI global study on assessing and reviewing the impact of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) projects on small arms availability and 
poverty. 




Two consultants spent 11 days in Rio de Janeiro in September 2004 to carry out 
stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions. Adèle Kirsten, had a historical 
knowledge of Viva Rio and was able to draw on her experience and interviews held in 
Rio between 2002 and 2003; as well as her experience in activism in South Africa; 
and a reference point of urban armed violence in Johannesburg. Lydia Richardson 
brought a knowledge of DFID and international donor interventions; poverty 
reduction strategies in Latin America; and a comparative analysis of urban armed 
violence and its impacts on poverty in El Salvador, having completed the case study 
for AVPI in relation to a UNDP project in El Salvador in February 2004. 
  
Due to the short time available for this field visit, secondary information was first 
collected which provided some statistical and qualitative information, and which was 
discussed and clarified during the visit. A final discussion with the director and 
international relations manager of Viva Rio helped to verify some of the findings and 
conclusions and enabled the consultants to give feedback and some initial 
recommendations to the organisation.   
 
Annex 1 provides a list of people interviewed in the course of the field research. 
Three visits were made outside Rio’s city centre – two to favelas, i.e. (Maré and 
Rocinha) and one to a small town, 250 km south west of Rio, i.e. (Resende). The 
purpose of these visits was to observe both the reality of armed violence and poverty 
in the State of Rio and to see some of Viva Rio’s projects in these locations. 
 
The complex relationship between the nature of violence experienced in Rio, to that 
of poverty, in particular social exclusion, meant that a choice had to be made on the 
definition of poverty. The term social exclusion is relatively new3 and is itself a 
relative term in that differences in societal norms can lead to major differences in its 
definition.  Its particular definitional characteristics must be therefore be understood 
as society specific.4 The EU defines social exclusion as ‘a process through which 
individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the 
society in which they live.’5Although both absolute and relative poverty are discussed 
                                                
3 The first use of the term is attributed to Lenoir, French Secretary of State for Social Action in Government in 
1974 when he was referring to people who did not fit into the norms of industrial societies. 
4 Laderchi, Saith and Stewart (2003). 
5 Ibid. 
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and analysed in the context section, in the analysis and conclusions, poverty has been 
defined as a relative rather than an absolute phenomenon. Therefore poverty is 
defined in terms of vulnerability, low self-esteem and feelings of social and economic 
exclusion, rather than just on a per capita income basis. Including the concept of 
social exclusion therefore involves a relative approach to the definition of poverty 
which includes focusing on the processes and dynamics which allow deprivation to 
arise and persist. The associations therefore between armed violence and poverty are 
far greater in this context than if a purely per capita income definition had been used. 
 
This report is structured in three main parts: 
• Context and relationship between armed violence and poverty. 
• Viva Rio’s approach to armed violence and poverty with examples of some of 
their programmes 




We would especially like to thank Rubem César Fernándes, Jessica Galeria, Maria 
Helena Moreira Alves, and Monica Nascimento for all their assistance as well as all 
those from within and outside Viva Rio who gave up their time to speak to us. 
 
 
2. Description of poverty and armed violence in Rio de Janeiro 
2.1  Context 
Brazil is South America's biggest and most influential country. It has the 15th largest 
economy in the world. It is the 5th largest country in the world in population, with 
176 million inhabitants. Annex 2 highlights some statistics on how Brazil is 
progressing towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals. 8.2 per cent of the 
population earn less than 1$ per day. In per capita income terms, it is classified by the 
World Bank as an upper middle-income country. 2002 figures show a Gross National 
Income (GNI) of US$ 494.5 billion and US$ 2,830 for GNI per capita. However, in 
spite of its income status, extreme inequalities are characteristic of Brazil, both 
between and within regions and cities, of which Rio de Janeiro is one example. Rio’s 
levels of inequality are stark. The richest one percent have 12 per cent of the city’s per 
capita income, whereas the poorest 50 per cent have only 13 per cent.6 Rio is the 
second largest city in population and GDP. Rio has approximately 5,550,000 
inhabitants, with 10,190,000 in its metropolitan area (1996 data).7 
Brazil’s history of colonisation and military dictatorship is one of dispossession, 
exclusion and repression. After more than twenty years of military dictatorship (1964-
1985), the country entered a period of democratisation. All these factors have in one 
way or another contributed to the particular type and levels of violence, social 
dislocation and poverty which characterise Brazil at the beginning of the 21st century. 
The Portuguese colonisation (1500 - 1822) brought many Africans to Brazil as slaves. 
The poorest region of the country is the North East where many Afro-Brazilians live. 
                                                
6 Consorcio Parceria 21(2002). 
7 UN Habitat.  
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However many Afro-Brazilians moved to the cities to escape poverty and settled in 
informal settlements known as favelas.  As a result of rapid urbanization during the 
80s coupled with a general economic decline, Rio’s informal sector grew rapidly and 
by 1998, 36 per cent of the city’s economically active population was in the informal 
sector. This exacerbated the existing inequalities of wealth and  contributed to Rio 
becoming the city with the largest number of absolute poor people (3.64 million) and 
the highest inequality index in Brazil – a Gini coefficient of 0.6738 in 1999.9 The 
population living in favelas in the urban periphery grew by 50.7 per cent.10  The 
collapse of the industrial and construction sectors in Rio has also contributed to rising 
male unemployment, while the rise of the predominantly female-staffed service sector 
has added to economic insecurity as the majority of workers in services have no 
contracts or legal protection. The relocation of the federal capital from Rio to Brasília 
in 1960 also had a significant impact on industry, commerce and public investment, 
which increased unemployment and absolute/relative poverty in Rio.11 
The favelas are spread around different parts of the city, in corridors on hills, on the 
coast, on mountains skirts, and in the interior. In 2003, the Pereira Passos Institute 
registered the existence of 618 favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In the year 2000, 
favelas had a total population of over one million inhabitants, representing around 19 
per cent of the total population in the city, and some of the largest favelas have over 
100,000 residents (17 per cent of a total population of 5.9 million).12 However the 
poor (measured in income terms) also live in inner-city slums, illegal, sub-divisions, 
and run-down estates. A World Bank study in 1999 estimated that less than one third 
of Rio’s poor live in favelas.13 The expansion of favelas in Rio formed part of the 
expansion of the city between 1950 and 1980.14 The state’s policy in relation to 
favelas has changed over time, initially forcibly resettling the population (which often 
resulted in violence) and incorporating the inhabitants into the city with the provision 
of some basic services such as schools, lighting and drainage. However, the main 
problem of illegal land tenure remains, with only very few cases of legalisation. The 
current government’s programme to socially and physically integrate the favelas is 
called Favela-Barrio.15  There are some strong organisational structures within the 
favelas such as neighbourhood associations and church groups. However the power in 
almost all favelas rests with drug trafficking gangs who have become a recognised 
‘socio-political force’.16 They maintain their ‘political power’ and enforce social order 
through a complex relationship with  favela residents which involve a double tactic of 
support from the community for a set of behavioural codes, such as only gang 
members being allowed to own guns, and punitive violence for non-compliance. This 
forms part of the ‘law and order’ in favelas.17 
 
                                                
8 This is higher than the national average of 0.61 (UNDP 2003) making it one of the most unequal cities in one of 
the world’s most unequal countries. (0=equality; 1=extreme inequality). 
9 Cardoso and Lago (1993)  in Fiori, Riley  and Ramirez (March 2000). 
10 Lago (2002) in Fiori, Riley and Ramirez (March 2000). 
11 Comment by Julia Buxton, senior research fellow, CICS, 25/11/04 
12 In Wakely and  Riley (September 2003); and Alba Zuluar, personal interview, 23/09/04. 
13 In Fiori (March 2000). 
14 Fiori, Riley and Ramirez (March 2000). 
15 Government programme of urbanization infrastructure and land regularization in favelas; some of the smaller 
favelas in Rio have gone through this process, whereby the state injects resources into making favelas into legal 
neighborhoods with access to government provided infrastructure. 
16 Dowdney (2003: p52). 
17 Ibid. 
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A form of class apartheid exists between the favelas and other areas of the city18: the 
discrimination against and stigmatisation of those living in favelas is in fact more 
marked than income differentials. The resulting feeling of exclusion is described by 
one of the residents of Rocinha: “The very existence of a favela is a violence. Why do 
we have to live on the top of the hills just like goats? Like others can live in the 
asphalt19”.20 
 
Viva Rio and others have tried to reduce this stigmatisation by showing that favelas 
are part of the population and economy and therefore should not be ignored, either by 
the state or the private sector. For example, favela residents receive some services, are 
economic consumers and political party candidates canvass in these areas. Statistics 
show that in class terms, it is not either class A or E but C (62 per cent) who 
predominantly live in favelas.21  
Other factors which need to be borne in mind when understanding the context of 
violence and social inequality are the high education drop out rates. Without the 
primary certificate it is almost impossible to get a job in the formal sector. Although 
the majority of young men between 14 to 24 years have 4-7 years of education, that 
does not prevent them from turning to armed drug gangs. This is not so much because 
of poverty and a lack of education but because of low self-esteem, with the perception 
that joining gangs provides a route to improved social status and is a source of identity 
and power. Women on the other hand, often become pregnant at a young age which is 
rumoured to give a feeling of identity. The police are also a source of violence in 
Brazil and the history of military rule means that they are armed and often heavy 
handed, which in turn contributes to the mistrust of the police by the civilian 
population. During the dictatorship they were an agent of political repression and 
were known for their use of torture and human rights abuses, and although police 
practice has changed over the last ten years, they continue to be feared by many 
people. There has been an “increase in police violence and brutality since the political 
transition, especially towards the poorer citizens who are considered the  ‘dangerous 
classes’.”22 In 2003, 621 civilians were killed by the police in Rio.23  
After 13 years of President Cardoso’s social democratic government which 
increasingly practised neo-liberal economic policies, Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva was 
elected as president. When he took office in January 2003, it was the first left wing 
government in 40 years. He promised political and economic reforms and pledged to 
eradicate hunger. More recently he has been seen to incorporate the fight against 
violence as part of his political agenda on the international stage.24  
                                                
18 Medrado (August 2004). 
19 Asphalt is the term used to describe the wealthy suburbs, implying good roads and infrastructure. 
20 Kirsten (2004). 
21 The definition of class is not based on income. It is an index called "Brazilian Criteria for Social Classification", 
established by ANEP (National Association of Market Research Enterprises), which uses as criteria: 1) ownership 
of a set of consumption goods (TV, radio, refrigerator, oven, vacuum cleaner, washing machine, bathroom, car, 
maid) and 2) educational level of head of family and of the person interviewed. 
 
22 Landman (2003:31). 
23 “Rio de Janeiro 2003”, Amnesty International Press Release (28 August 2003). 
24 O Globo (Sept 2004: 22). 
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2.2  Progress in relation to meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) 
The MDGs have not been designed to reflect the specific reality of Rio. Extreme 
poverty and hunger are not as relevant to the development agenda in Rio as social 
exclusion. Combating violence and improving the rule of law are very relevant in this 
context but they do not appear within the MDGs. However, the more relevant MDGs 
relate to: 
• Education which is of a very low quality in government schools. Many residents 
of favelas do not obtain the primary school certificate (eight years of schooling) 
which means that they are less likely to get a job in the formal economy. 
• Partnership for development is a relevant goal as many institutions are fragmented 
within the government system. Police for example operate at three levels (federal, 
state and municipal) with little integration either at policy level or in practice. 
Partnerships between government, civil society (including the private sector) is 
also uncommon. There is very little international development aid in Rio. The 
Official Development Assistance to Brazil is given in Annex 3. However those 
present (e.g. World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, UN-Habitat) do 
appear to be cooperating. As can be seen in Annex 2 one indicator for this is the 
partnership for development MDG  “youth unemployment rate (percentage of 
total labor force ages 15-24)”. This is highly relevant to the issue of violence and 
the statistics for Brazil are getting worse - 6.7 per cent in 1990 compared to 17.9 
per cent in 2001.  
• Environmental sustainability is highly relevant due to the environmental 
vulnerability of the favelas in part due to the steep topography of the land and in 
some cases polluted water sources. 
• Brazil has a very good policy on HIV/AIDS and treatment is relatively accessible 
and subsidized by the state.  
• Limited figures were available for Rio’s maternal mortality. The MDG statistics 
show maternal mortality at 260 per 100,000 live births. Health facilities are in 
need of improvement. 
 
2.3 Armed violence in Brazil and Rio 
 
After the political transition from dictatorship to democracy in the late 1980s, Brazil 
experienced a “dramatic increase in crime levels, especially violent crimes”25. One of 
the reasons for the growth in violent crime, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, was the 
growth of criminal organisations associated with the illegal commerce of drugs and 
firearms.26 The gangs and their ‘private armies’ are in control of much of the urban 
space in the favelas and this has had a significant impact on the strategies adopted by 
the police with regard to reducing gun violence as well as those adopted by civil 
society organisations such as Viva Rio. 27 
 
A variety of factors contributed to the growth in violence in Brazil in the 1980s: 
increasing urbanization, the socio-economic crises, the changing population 
demographics, contestation over public services, and the lack of an integrated public 
safety strategy. The expansion of drugs and arms trafficking in the principal cities of 
                                                
25 Landman (2003:6). 
26 Viva Rio (2001); Landman (2003:18). 
27 Kirsten (2004).  
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Brazil changed “the patterns of criminality both with respect to the age of the actors 
and the lethality of their acts”.28 The growth of drug related violence came with the 
expansion of cocaine production in Colombia from the early 1980s onwards, 
coinciding with the economic recession in Brazil.29 There was also an important 
diversification of South American trafficking routes in the 1990s when Mercosur 
came into effect (easing border restrictions and freedom of goods and movement) and 
in response to enhanced enforcement efforts against drug shipments flowing 
northwards out of Colombia. Counter-narcotics enforcement activities in Rio have 
been undermined by police corruption and lack of funding.  High rates of crime and 
violence in Latin American cities are not an urban-specific phenomenon but create a 
particular set of problems in urban areas and have become a ‘serious development 
constraint’.30 This will be illustrated throughout the paper, particularly in the example 
of rising armed violence in Rocinha. 
 
Within favelas, a primary source of violence is related to the drug gangs, although it is 
estimated that only 1-2 per cent of favela residents are involved.31 The primary 
perpetrators are young men between the ages of 14-29 years. They are also the 
primary victims. However, often civilians are killed during inter-gang armed violence 
either in the ‘cross-fire’ or as a result of offensive police operations. Women are 
involved increasingly in the gangs, although not on the front line 
 
There is a wealth of information on the relationship between violence, poverty and 
drug gangs, not just in Rio, but also in Latin America. We will just touch on the key 
features of this phenomenon in Rio. Although the drug gangs have been in Rio since 
the 1950s there have been significant changes in the nature of their operations since 
the 80s. This is characterised by ‘increased territorial disputes between armed groups 
that dominate different favelas’; increased use of violence and more sophisticated and 
greater firepower; and increased organisational management and structures.32 Many of 
these changes came about as a result of the trade in cocaine. This mode of operation 
has effectively led to a ‘territorialisation’ of favelas.33 What this means is that there is 
an increasing need for gangs to take control of more and more territory, either within 
a particular favela or across several favelas. This can lead to so-called ‘border clashes’ 
or invasions. However, the drug factions have been built on pre-existing local 
structures of control and protection that existed in the 50s.34  The growth and power 
exercised by the gangs in favelas has partly been possible due to the absence of the 
state in these areas. As Dowdney observes: “they have created a control system based 
on violence or the threat of violence whereby they receive community protection in 
exchange for offering what the state has failed to provide: the maintenance of social 
order, support, economic stimulation and provision of leisure activities.”35  
 
There is relative calm when one gang controls an area, but when there are territorial 
disputes, violence erupts. The narco-traffic gangs maintain a relative peace and social 
order by intimidation, sometimes through overt violence, and at others through 
                                                
28 Fernandes, Phebo & Dreyfuss (2003). 
29 Interview with Pablo Dreyfus, September 2004 
30 Moser et al. (2003). 
31 Estimates are very difficult to verify. Surveys are more likely to be qualitative than quantitative. 
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increasingly controlling some services in the favela (e.g. taking over supply of gas). 
For young men with limited education, lack of opportunity and feelings of 
stigmatisation, the gangs provide some form of social cohesion, order, apparent 
opportunity, status and identity, and security (at their discretion) at the cost of 
intimidation. This actually further exacerbates their social exclusion from the 
economy and society.   
 
Victims of gun violence 
Brazil has one of the highest homicide rates in the world at 29.2 per 100,000 
inhabitants. Over the last ten years 300,000 homicides have been committed in Brazil, 
the majority committed with a firearm in urban crime and violence.36 Young men are 
the group most affected by gun violence. Those between the ages of 15-29 years are 
twice as likely to die from guns than the rest of the male population. The risk of death 
by firearm in Brazil is 2.6 times that in the rest of the world.  Although Brazil only 
represents 3% of the global population, their firearm homicides represent 7% of the 
world total. For young men between the ages of 15-29 years, the homicide rate is 
113.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. Over a period of almost 20 years the firearm related 
deaths for young men between the ages of 15-19 years has risen dramatically from 
35% of all non-natural deaths in 1983 to 65% in 2001. 
 
In Rio, guns are the primary cause of non-natural death for young men between the 
age of 15-19 years (65%), exceeding car accidents and natural causes.  In 1999, 13% 
of Brazilians died from external causes and of these, 27% were from firearms, just 
over 31,000. Another distinguishing feature of gun deaths in Brazil are the differences 
between men and women. For Brazil firearms death rate for men is 34.9 per 100,000 
whereas for women it is 2.6 
per 100,000.  In Rio the gap between men and women remains high with 79.5 per 
100,000 for males and 4.3 per 100,000 for females. 
 
Arms industry 
Brazil is the largest manufacturer of small arms and light weapons in the 
MERCOSUR region and its armaments industry produces and exports arms and 
ammunition, successfully penetrating the international markets. The industry lacks 
effective regulation over the production, trade and use of firearms, contributing to the 
high levels of firearm violence, particularly in high-density urban areas such a Sao 
Paulo and Rio.37  Although Brazil has two of the most internationally well known gun 
manufacturers (Rossi and Taurus), their contribution to the economy is regarded as 
insignificant by some researchers.38 Contrary to popular opinion, the majority of guns 
used in crime in Rio are locally manufactured and a significant proportion are legal. 
Of all the guns recovered between 1950 to 2003, 33.1 per cent were formally legally 
registered guns. Over 50 per cent of guns recovered in this same period were either 
Rossi or Taurus, of which 78 per cent were either revolvers or pistols.39 
 
                                                
36 Pablo Dreyfus et al (2003), Small Arms Control in MERCOSUR, Latin American series no3. Interntaional Alert 
and Viva Rio. 
37 Pablo Dreyfus et al (2003), Small Arms Control in MERCOSUR, Latin America Series, No 3. International 
Alert and Viva Rio. 
38 Dreyfuss (2004). 
39 Ibid. 
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Costs of violence 
Both the state and its citizens absorb the costs of violence. In 1995, Brazil spent 5 per 
cent of its GDP on combating criminal violence, which increased to 10.2 per cent in 
2002. Annex 4 gives some figures for the cost of violence for the city of Rio. 
Investment in security is twice that of education; five times that of health; and fifty 
times that of housing. In 2002, in a middle class neighbourhood (Tijuca), violence 
made the real estate value drop by 60 per cent.40 
 
The public health cost is great and Rio accounts for 19 per cent of all Loss of 
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) lost compared to cancer which accounts for 
10.3 per cent.41 
 
3. Viva Rio 
3.1 Background 
Viva Rio is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Rio de Janeiro. It 
started in 1993 as an organised response from civil society to two incidents of armed 
violence by the police against innocent civilians. Viva Rio works primarily in the city 
and the State of Rio de Janeiro and is increasingly working in other States mainly in 
partnership with government and like-minded NGOs such as Sou da Paz in São Paulo. 
Viva Rio also plays an important role in MERCOSUR, assisting in the development 
of regional small arms control measures. 
3.2  Viva Rio’s approach to addressing armed violence and poverty 
reduction/social exclusion 
Although Viva Rio was established in response to the high levels of violence in Rio 
de Janeiro, it soon discovered that it could not just focus on reducing armed violence 
through gun control and police reform. There was a growing understanding that 
reducing violence requires a multifaceted approach, involving long-term solutions 
which included changing the culture of machismo, increasing levels of social 
inclusion and developing a culture of non-violence. The director of Viva Rio believes 
that given the nature of violence in Rio it is neither possible nor effective to maintain 
a ‘single issue’ focus on firearms as the primary cause of violence.42 Therefore, Viva 
Rio began to bring the two key elements of violence in the city together: that of the 
availability and misuse of firearms and high levels of social exclusion. In 1996, Viva 
Rio began implementing projects at the grass roots level, deepening their engagement 
with the marginalised and those most affected by gun violence. At the same time Viva 
Rio recognised that solutions to urban violence required strategies that engaged with a 
number of role-players such as the state, civil society, at risk groups and the media. 
Viva Rio has a holistic approach to reducing violence. It is able to combine a complex 
and diverse set of activities and objectives working towards the long term vision of a 
peaceful social order resulting in what has been described as ‘an evidence based 
strategy for advocacy and action.’43 Although it recognises firearms as the primary 
                                                
40 O Globo (13/04/02). 
41 Brinceño-León (1999) in Moser et al (2003). 
42 Interview with Rubem César Fernandes, Director of Viva Rio, 26/10/02. 
43 Email from William Godnick, Interntiaonl Alert, 25/11/04. 
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tools of violence it does not just focus on gun control and disarmament but also 
addresses the issue of police reform, a key requirement for reducing violence. Viva 
Rio is also clear that the social exclusion of many of Rio’s residents is another key 
factor contributing to the violence and argues that unless the issue of social exclusion 
is addressed, violence will not abate. Therefore, Viva Rio describes its strategy as a 
dual focus which integrates violence reduction efforts and social inclusion. It does this 
through focusing on two broad areas (programmes): 
• Public Security and Human Rights 
• Social Inclusion/Development  
The organogram of Viva Rio (Diagram 1) illustrates the structure and key areas and 
projects. 
DIAGRAM 1: Viva Rio Organogram 
      Source: Viva Rio presentation: 15/09/04. 
The Public Security and Human Rights programme includes projects such as small 
arms control, security sector reform and conflict mediation. The key objectives of the 
social inclusion programme are to improve people’s access to the job market through 
improved education levels, building self-esteem and improved economic and social 
mobility. This includes projects such as the Viva Cred and the telecurso. An important 
component of both programmes is their focus on the at risk group of youth between 
the age of 15-29 years. However, there is a greater emphasis on this target group in 
the social inclusion programme, as one of the key factors contributing to young men 
joining the drug gangs is lack of self-esteem, poor education levels and lack of 
alternatives both in terms of employment and identity. The Children in Organized 
Armed Violence project (COAV) which itself has several different activities under its 
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two key programme areas and has activities under both the Youth at Risk Project and 
the Small Arms Control project. Viva Rio also has several cross cutting themes such 
as research, monitoring mechanisms, training (includes citizenship classes) and 
communication.  
Viva Rio is a large NGO with over a hundred employees and over a thousand more 
who receive some monetary gain as a result of being involved in a Viva Rio project. 
They have nearly 400 projects in the city of Rio, concentrated mostly in the north and 
the west zones. Although their primary focus is the city and the State of Rio they now 
have 51 projects in other states in Brazil. Their extensive reach has in part been due to 
the over 700 partnerships they have formed, ranging from educational and religious 
institutions through to private enterprise and neighbourhood associations. Viva Rio’s 
growth is also reflected in their annual income which has increased from US$600,000 
in 1995 to almost US$6m in 2003 - its average annual income for the last five years.  
Several of Viva Rio’s projects will be discussed in more detail to illustrate their 
integrative approach. Annex 5 provides more detailed analysis of the various projects 
across the two key programmes, identifying key objectives, indicators and relative 
impact on both violence and poverty reduction.  
3.3 Public Security and Human Rights Programme 
The primary objective of this programme is to increase levels of safety and security44 
within the city of Rio and increasingly across the State. It does this through four 
projects: 
 
a) Small Arms Control 
• Legal reform, which includes the Buy Back campaign and a referendum on a ban 
on civilian possession in 2005 
• National Plan on Small Arms and Ammunition Control  
• MERCOSUR 
 
b) Security Sector Reform 
• Training programme for police 
• Community Policing in favelas (GPAE) 
• Municipal Public Safety Plan – pilot in Resende and two other sites chosen 
 
c) Conflict Mediation 
• Citizens Rights counters established in favelas  
 
d) Children in Organised Armed Violence (COAV) 
• Fight for Peace Boxing Club 
• Rescue 
• Research 
• PROASP (Public Security Actions Programme) 
3.3.1. The Small Arms Control Project 
                                                
44 In Portuguese, the word Segurança, means both safety and security. 
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3.3.1.1 Overview of project 
The Small Arms Control project is also referred to as the Reduction of Armed 
Violence Program or the Program on Disarmament. This programme has three key 
objectives: 
• to reduce the demand for guns 
• to reduce the supply of firearms 
• to control existing firearms stocks both within the state as well as in civilian hands 
 
Box 1: Rio Sem Armas – buy-back programme 
 
The Brazilian government declared a national firearms amnesty (voluntary weapons 
collection) from 15 July to 23 December 2004. 
 
Objective: 
To remove firearms from the civilian population in order to reduce the potential for guns to be 
stolen and/or used in crime and to reduce the number of gun deaths and injury in the home. 
 
Partnership: 
A unique state/civil society partnership. Viva Rio is co-coordinating the buy back programme, 
which includes a communications campaign to raise awareness, building networks, sharing 
information and establishing collection points. The Government is collating data and 
processing the funds. 
 
Cost: 
$R 30 million (US$10m) allocated. A further $R60million (US$20m) is needed. Amounts of 
$R100 -$R300 are paid, depending on type and numbers of guns handed in i.e US$33 for a 
pistol and US$100 for an automatic weapon. 
 
Target group: 
Law-abiding gun owners. Data shows the majority are over 50 years. Initially, primarily men 
but increasingly women.  
 
Incentives: 
Not wanting the gun to get into the ‘wrong hands’; fear of robbery to steal the gun; direct or 
indirect experience of violence; people tired of the violence; money.    
 
Collection points: 
Major focus in three cities – São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco. (Parana on its own 
steam). Viva Rio established one collection point at the VR offices where guns are 
immediately destroyed; one at TV ROC on outskirts of Rocinha; and a mobile collection point   
in partnership with TV Globo. Two sites in Sao Paulo in partnership with Sou da Paz. Federal 
govt. established five collection points. 
 
Impact: 
120,000 guns collected from July to September 2004. This is small compared to the numbers 
that exist in the country. Mainly 9mm, old, but functional guns. 
 
Challenges:  
VR dissatisfied with the lack of state support and involvement in the campaign. Partly due to 
municipal elections due 3 October. Need broad national network of collection points and to 
extend deadline to maximise impacts. 
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VR does this through three key activities: 
• Campaigning for a new national firearms law 
• Developing an integrated national plan for Brazil on Small Arms and Ammunition 
Control through information systems, tracing programs and capacity building of 
the police to operate the systems 
Developing regional small arms control regimes through information production and 
exchange, increased border controls in MERCOSUR, and training NGOs on SALW 
issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
  
In 2001 an NGO disarmament network was formed with members from MERCOSUR 
countries. The network shares research data, holds seminars, established a website in 
2002 and conducts training on advocacy and campaigning strategies on SALW. 
Although this project has a very explicit and distinct focus on small arms control and 
has limited interaction with the community development projects, most staff articulate 
the overall aims of the SALW project as integrating the efforts of violence reduction 
as a necessary component to create the conditions which can bring services to areas 
where the state is not present, and where people are largely excluded from the socio-
economic system, in particular the economic markets.  
 
The primary focus of this project has been influencing public policy through research 
aimed at influencing state practice and mobilising public opinion in support of these 
policies.  
 
3.3.1.2 Campaigning for new Firearms Legislation  
Viva Rio has campaigned for stricter national firearms legislation since 1999. The 
‘Rio, Abaixe essa Arma’ (Rio, Put that Gun Down) campaign mobilised support for a 
change in the firearms legislation, collecting over a million signatures supporting the 
banning of the commerce of small arms in Brazil.45. The use of research and the 
collection of data on types of firearms used in gun related crime in Rio were critical in 
building Viva Rio’s relationship with the state. It increased the state’s confidence in 
the NGO sector and enhanced VRs ability to contribute to the debate on security and 
firearms control.46  
 
In December 2003 the Disarmament Statue was passed which restricts firearm 
ownership through increasing the age limit and introducing gun registration. It also 
increases penalties for illegal possession and trafficking. The law does not just focus 
on the control of civilian ownership but also requires the centralization of all firearm 
related data with the federal police as well as the marking of ammunition sold to the 
security forces. An innovation in the law, enacted in July 2004, provides for a future 
national referendum on the banning of civilian firearms ownership, expected to be 
held in 2005.  
 
One of the factors which make arms control work difficult in Rio and in Brazil, is the 
strong machismo culture combined with an attitude that having a gun makes you 
safer. Although the law’s primary objective is to reduce the supply of guns and 
control stocks, it also addresses demand through questioning the ownership of guns as 
a positive social norm.  Challenging this is done through a sophisticated media and 
                                                
45 1,312,929 audited signatures were collected. 
46 Interview with Pablo Dreyfuss (Viva Rio), 2/06/03. 
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communications campaign which includes posters, banners, radio commercials and 
websites. The government amnesty programme has provided Viva Rio with an 
opportunity to articulate its disarmament message through the very public nature of 
the campaign, and to measure its impact by the numbers of guns being handed in.  
 
The objectives of this project are integrated through its activities, particularly in 
addressing issues of demand and supply simultaneously. A good example of this is the 
Buy Back campaign (see box 1). 
 
3.3.1.3 Children in Organised Armed Violence (COAV): The Fight for 
Peace Boxing Club 
The Fight for Peace Boxing club is one of the only Viva Rio projects that is explicit 
about its intention to encourage young men (and now women) not to go into the 
armed drug gangs. The target group is youth between the ages of 15-24 years, with a 
specific emphasis on those between 15-17 years of age as this is when they are most 
vulnerable to becoming both a perpetrator and a victim of gun violence. Although 
small, this project has had a significant impact on the lives of individuals (See Box 2).  
 
Box 2: Fight for peace – Sergio’s story47 
 
Sergio* is a 19-year-old man who lives in Maré and works at the Fight for Peace 
boxing club. He has been coming to the club since he was 14 years old. He had a 
disruptive childhood and comes from a fragmented and socially dislocated family. 
The one constant parental influence in his life has been his paternal grandmother. His 
father has been in prison for 10 years for armed robbery, and prior to that he served 
three years for assault. Sergio was by his own admission a ‘naughty’ child – he 
bunked school, enjoyed partying, and got involved in fights and petty crime such as 
shoplifting and assault.  He left school after grade three. Although he was exposed to 
the drug gangs and has cousins involved in the gangs (two of his aunts were killed in 
gang related activity), he was never attracted to them. He attributes this lack of 
interest as “just something inside of me.”  At 15 he heard about the Boxing club and 
decided he wanted to join and learn how to fight properly. When he arrived he 
discovered that it was more than a boxing club: there were all these rules which 
included no fighting outside the club and obligatory attendance at the citizenship 
classes.  Sergio thinks the main object of the project is to create champions inside and 
outside the ring. He feels that the project has not changed who he is – he still likes to 
party and he has always been against the drug gangs. What it did change is that it 
reduced his chance of being killed. Maré is a violent community and he thinks that he 
could have been killed given what he was doing. It also gave him a job and self-
esteem. He is back at school in the fourth grade. As the father of a 3-year-old boy he 
has hopes for his child:  to grow up in this community, go to school, then university 
and live a good life. He has his own hopes: to write up his life story when, as he says, 
“I am a complete winner.” 
 
Sergio’s story is similar to many others who join the club. However, unlike him, some 
of the club members have been involved in the armed drug gangs. The club offers 
these young men the opportunity to develop an alternative identity, through helping 
                                                
47 Name has been changed to protect identity 
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build their self-esteem, developing a culture of rights, responsibilities and duties and 
thereby creating greater opportunity for entering the formal economy. Sergio may also 
be similar to many other young men who are not in the club, whose daily experience 
of violence may have made them both immune to it and also accepting of it as a norm. 
In a survey48 done with young men in the favelas, a significant number do not see 
their communities as violent, although the majority recognised that there are high 
levels of violence where they live. This may also be because the violence is primarily 
concentrated between the drug gangs and not directed at them. 
3.4. Social Inclusion and Development Programme 
The primary objective of this programme area is to provide opportunities for income 
generation and to improve access to and levels of education. All the projects in this 
programme operate mainly in the favelas. The education project in particular has an 
intended focus on the at risk group although this is not explicitly stated and survey 
results show that the group making most use of this service are in the 20-29 year age 
group.49 This means that the pre-20s at risk group need interventions that do not just 
address the issue of education. 
The programme has two key projects, each with a number of activities: 
3.4.1    Community development 
• Viva Cred grants credit to small businesses; training 
• Fair Trade is a cooperative of over 300 seamstresses; technical and managerial 
training 
• Future stations – computer centres that give people access to the Internet, 
provide training and assist in seeking employment. A total of 11 stations with 
an average of 3000 visitors a month. 
3.4.2 Education 
• Telecurso – an accelerated education programme 
• First Job – assisting people in preparing and obtaining a job 
• Sports and Art – primary center is the Crianca Esperanca in Cantagalo 
3.4.2.1 Telecurso 
Viva Rio in partnership with the Roberto Marinho foundation initiated the ‘telecurso’ 
programme: an accelerated learning course, operating primarily in low-income 
neighbourhoods. The ‘telecurso’ is a video-based curriculum, approved by the State 
Secretary of Education and taught by live instructors. Students receive their 
elementary school certificate after ten months which is equivalent to seven years of 
formal schooling. Without this certificate it is almost impossible to enter the formal 
job market. Since 1997, more than 60,000 students have participated in these 
courses.50  No follow up has been done on any of these students but with the imminent 
                                                
48 Dowdney (2003). 
49 Viva Rio presentation, Rio de Janeiro, 2004. 
50 Viva Rio (2003). 
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state roll-out programme a monitoring component has been included. Although the 
main aim of the ‘telecurso’ is to increase people’s opportunity to participate in the 
formal economy, it also seeks to build social inclusion. It does this through including 
citizenship classes in the curriculum. Eucrezio Ribeiro, one of the co-ordinators of the 
‘telecurso’ says, ‘what we (VR) created was to work with socially excluded people, to 
create jobs, to turn people into social actors and to create community leadership.”51 
 
The telecurso project demonstrates three key elements which are present in almost all 
of Viva Rio’s projects: using a methodology of pilot projects; partnership with the 
state; and developing public policy. The pilot project methodology has enabled Viva 
Rio to test out an idea to determine its feasibility and then replicate it if the pilot 
demonstrates success. Included in this strategy is developing partnerships with the 
state to either assist in the replication of these successful projects, through funding or 
partnerships, or to wholly take over the project, thereby mainstreaming it. The 
‘telecurso’ was one of Viva Rio’s first major successful projects in disadvantaged 
communities and it was also one of the first examples of a successful and positive 
partnership with the state. They entered into a partnership with the Labour department 
and the city mayor to establish 144 telesalas (classrooms). From the outset, Viva Rio’s 
intention was that this partnership would influence government to develop an 
education policy for ‘dropouts’52, eventually taking over the entire project, with Via 
Rio maintaining links through the local leadership and continuing its role in building 
social citizenship. The expanded and fully state-supported up-scaling of this project 
was launched on 6 October 2004. 
Similar to the Fight for Peace project, it is able to make a difference in an individual 
person’s life. Here is one example. 
Box 3: Telecurso – Patricia’s story * 
 
Patricia is 16 years old and has been in the telecurso programme since May 2004. Three years 
ago her family moved to Resende from Rio, to escape the violence. When they first arrived in 
Resende they lived in a corner house of an alleyway, which served as a drug sales point. She 
witnessed a lot of gun violence: young men being killed; sometimes they were forced by the 
drug gangs to hide drugs, weapons and even the young gang members. It took the family a 
long time to settle. Her mother was unable to get her into a local school as they were all full. 
She spent two years out of the formal schooling system before joining the telecurso. Her 
mother is a domestic worker and her stepfather a street cleaner. She has a younger brother 
who is intellectually disabled and needs a lot of care.  
 
Patricia feels that there are other kinds of violence in favelas such as beatings, neglect and 
abuse of children and alcohol abuse which leads to fighting. Although she is afraid of the 
armed drug gangs she says they have not affected her in any way (as in being drawn in) and 
that she stays away from them. She feels that living with the gangs is both good and bad – the 
good being that it teaches you how to live in difficult circumstances and survive and not get 
involved. It is bad because of the killings and gunshots you hear at night. She feels that the 
only way violence will change in favelas is to give people more opportunity to get jobs and 
training. She feels the telecurso is not enough on its own – that many more programmes are 
needed which include sports. However, she also believes that violence is for those who want 
to get involved and that although the alternatives are limited they are there.  
                                                
51 Interview with Eucrezio Ribeiro, 25/10/02, in Kersten (2004). 
52 Term used to describe students who leave school before completing their elementary education 
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For her the link between violence and poverty is very clear – if she has to go for a job 
interview she will immediately be stigmatised if she says where she lives as people see 
favelas as both violent and poor. This will negatively impact on her ability to get a job. The 
most important part of the telecurso for her is that she can do it at night which enables her to 
take other classes during the day and perhaps do some small jobs. What she likes most is 
discussing issues that are important in the community such as discrimination and drugs.  
* Names have been changed to protect identity 
 
Both examples of young people who have benefited from Viva Rio’s projects in 
favelas demonstrate the complex relationship favela residents have to violence in their 
community, in particular to the drug gangs. Their ‘apparent’ acceptance of the levels 
of violence in their communities as well as their understanding of how it limits their 
opportunities reinforces Moser’s view that the complexity of violence means “that its 
relationship with poverty is neither uni-directional not straightforward.”53 These 
stories also illustrate the impact of violence on the livelihood, well-being and security 
of the disadvantaged or poor on the one hand, and on the other, how  “poverty and 
inequality levels mean that the poor are frequently held responsible for much of the 
crime and violence in the cities”.54 They also show the negative impact that violence 
has on family structure and function and social dislocation.  
 
Both examples demonstrate the impact that social exclusion and feelings of 
stigmatisation and lack of self-esteem have on slowing down or delaying the 
development of skills and confidence for completing school and preparing for the job 
market. These two young people do not want to leave their communities, despite the 
high level of violence and social disruption.  
 
4. Exploring the impact of armed violence on poverty and development  
 
Understanding the impact of armed violence on poverty and development within the 
context of Rio is best illustrated through a case study of a particular community which 
after having experienced several years of ‘relative peace’, erupted into violence in 
early 2004. 
 
Box 5: Case study of Rocinha 
 
Relative calm 
Rocinha is one of the largest and wealthier favelas in Rio. It has a population of at least 
120,000 living on two hillsides between two upper-middle class areas of Rio.55 This number 
is disputed by residents in the community who claim that it could be as high as 300,000.56 It is 
seen as an anomaly compared to other favelas due to its size and relative wealth. It has paved 
roads in some sections and precarious electricity cabling. 63 per cent of favela residents in the 
Municipality of Rio have not got their primary certificate (less than 8 years of education), 
with the average years of schooling for Rocinha residents being 3.13 years. This means that 
the likely earning capacity of these residents is dramatically reduced:57 
 
 
Comparison of average earning capacity (in Reals – R$) per education level 
                                                
53 Moser et al. (2003). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Medrado (2004). 
56 Rocinha focus group interview, 31,05/03. 
57 Viva Rio, from PME/IBGE data 1997. 
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Illiterate  1 - 4 years of 
study 
5 to 8 years of 
study 
9 to 11 years of 
study 
More than 12 
years 
R$ 232 R$ 297 R$ 326 R$ 503 R$ 1263 
 
In a focus group with Rocinha residents (May 2003) there was consensus that Rocinha was a 
safe community in which to live, as there had not been any violence over the last eight to ten 
years. What residents meant by this was that if there was any violence it happened on the 
outskirts of their community, that they were not directly in the ‘firing line’ and that they were 
able to carry on with their normal day-to-day activities such as attending night school, 
opening a small business and organising community meetings. This attitude towards the 
violence in their community is partly influenced by the view that ‘we cannot see the violence. 
We have to look past it.’58 They acknowledged that their primary experience of violence was 
that of being excluded from the formal job market, feelings of stigmatisation and lack of 
educational and economic opportunities.59  
 
Viva Rio has several projects in this community including a future station, a Viva Cred office 
and the Balcau de Direitos. The telecurso also has several classes in Rocinha. Rocinha also 
has a history of organising around social issues such as greater service delivery which is done 
through residents associations (e.g. UPMMR – union for improvement of Rocinha’s 
residents) and other civil society organisations such as the churches. 
 
Outbreak of war 
One of the reasons for this ‘relative peace’ is because Rocinha has been controlled for many 
years by one drug faction, Comando Vermelho (CV - Red Command).  For example, the 
favela of Complexo de Maré is as large but much more violent as three drug factions fight for 
territory there. 
 
On the night of 8th April 2004, war broke out.60 There were 24 hours of shootings, confusion 
and violence. The cause of the violence: a dispute between two armed drug gangs for 
domination of the territory. The CV which had been in control of this community for many 
years first experienced some internal power struggle in the months leading up to the outbreak 
of armed violence and then was challenged for territorial control by another drug faction, 
Amigos dos Amigos (ADA). This outbreak of violence was both unexpected and also 
predicted. It was unexpected because Rocinha has a history of no particular loyalty to a 
particular faction (one of the explanations for the relative peace). It was predictable because 
from January 2004 there were rumours about the increasing factionalism within CV and 
between CV and ADA. The situation felt unstable and people felt unsafe but also impotent in 
preventing the situation from turning violent.  
 
Role of the police 
On 2nd January 2004 the police entered Rocinha, with the rumour: ‘there’s going to be a 
war.’61 Their presence was interpreted as being based on good police intelligence – they knew 
there was going to be a battle for territorial control. However, despite this knowledge, their 
presence which was supposedly a preventive measure, exacerbated the situation. One  
criticism, is that the police were unable to intervene in any way on the night of the outbreak. 
In the end, their prior knowledge and heavy presence did not stop the outbreak of violence. 
During the height of the violence, approximately 1200 police were stationed in Rocinha. 
                                                
58 Interview Carlinhos Costa, 17/09/04. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Almost everyone referred to the outbreak of violence as ‘war’. 
61 Interview  with Carlinhos Costa, 17/09/04. 
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People are ambivalent about the police: on the one hand, they are critical of the police role an 
on the other, were pleased that they were around. Carlinhos Costa believes that this lack of 
effective policing is primarily due to the lack of a comprehensive and integrated policy 
approach to public safety at State and Federal government level.  When the ‘war’ ended, the 
police left.  
 
Impact 
Five people were killed in the 24 hours of heavy armed violence. Of these only one was a 
drug trafficker, the others were civilians – two women and three men. Two of the victims 
were killed in the first few minutes of the ‘war’ when all the lights were shot out as the ADA 
moved into Rocinha. However, in the months leading up to the outbreak of violence, there 
had been a heavy police presence and they were responsible for 16 deaths from January 
through to May 2004. 
 
The most noticeable impact of the violence was the complete lack of civic activity in the 
community on the day after the outbreak of the ‘war.’ Everything was closed. People stayed 
in their homes for 24 hours: children did not go to school, adults did not go to work, and 
students were unable to attend night classes or use the future station. Those working night 
shift either did not go to work or stayed at their place of work for several nights until they felt 
safe to return home. Some people lost their jobs either because they failed to arrive at work 
for several days or small businesses had to close or reduce staff because of a significant drop 
in earnings. Resident’s routines were severely disrupted and for several weeks after people 
remained fearful and uneasy. However, residents also felt more united after the violence and 
wanted to come together in solidarity to support and reinforce existing social networks, with a 
desire to return to the previous ‘relative peace.’ Carlinhos believes that the ‘war’ is not over 
as the issue of territorial domination has not been resolved. In the streets of Rocinha, there 
remain some signs that the CV has not completely disappeared from people’s affections: most 
of the CV graffiti has been obliterated with ADA graffiti but on the high walls and in obscure 
nooks the CV graffiti remains together with their favourite slogans. 
 
The immediate and short-term impacts of violence on this one community are clear: loss of 
life; loss of income; loss of economic activity; increased feelings of insecurity and fear; and 
changing social relations. The long-term impacts are unclear but may include increased 
possibilities of renewed outbreaks of violence, more deaths and greater levels of insecurity, 
which in turn will also negatively impact on economic activity, and the disruption of routine 
life. 
 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Viva Rio’s success is in large part due to combining their long-term vision of a 
peaceful social order with short-term achievable objectives which address some of the 
immediate issues through activities such as weapons collection programmes and the 
boxing club project. What this demonstrates is that effective SALW interventions are 
a collective of initiatives with overlapping goals over time and not a finite project that 
delivers concrete results based on a project log frame alone. Their success is also not 
dependent on one single donor or project. Rather these results have been achieved 
because of a combination of international, foundation and NGO donors over time who 
have continued to invest in an already successful process.62 
 
One focus of this research was to highlight either existing or possible future 
indicators for monitoring and measuring the links between armed violence and 
                                                
62 Comment  by William Godnick, International Alert and peer review, 25/11/04 
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poverty, and the ways in which an organisation or project could design an intervention 
to address these issues. The following were seen as particularly important (where they 
are being measured, the results are given in brackets):  
• Degree of public support for civilians not carrying guns (to be tested through 
national referendum in 2005).  
• Number of guns collected (120,000 from July to September 2004). 
• Changes in level of trust between police and community (demonstrated through 
respondents of the community policing programme (GPAE); could be monitored 
in more depth in the future). 
• Use of violence by police reduced (to be tested through the GPAE). 
• Favela organisations able to continue projects without Viva Rio’s presence. 
• Attitudinal change of individuals of target age and wider society in relation to 
building a culture of peace, social responsibility, socio-economic mobility not 
through drug gangs. 
• Change in degree of socio-economic inclusion. 
• Degree of interaction between programmes (either within or outside Viva Rio) 
addressing the multi-faceted nature of armed violence causes, perpetrators and 
victims. 
 
Sustainability and impact of Viva Rio’s programmes 
• Strong on ensuring financial sustainability and ability to mainstream projects into 
the state system. 
• Could be stronger in relation to strengthening local community organisations and 
empowerment. 
• Impacts: raising awareness around danger of guns. 
• Effective in removal of guns from society, although not necessarily those 
currently being used in armed violence. 
• Demonstration of partnership with the state. 
• Pilot initiatives in social inclusion and police reform, some of which have been 
mainstreamed by the state (e.g. telecurso). 
 
Key success factors of Viva Rio: 
• Community projects are located within favelas. 
• Staff within projects are largely from the same community. 
• Political buy-in. 
• Sophisticated Communications Campaign: use of communications for raising 
awareness and embedding media organisations within Viva Rio. 
• Piloting initiatives which are suitable for state mainstreaming. 
• Put in place databases to build statistical data and evidence to support projects and 
campaigns. 
• Use of research to ensure that the context and risk and protection factors are fully 
understood in order to focus policy and interventions. 
• Using communication to establish links across isolated community groups in 
conflict (e.g. Viva Favela). 
• Developed partnerships with the state. 
• Diverse funding sources have been a successful strategy as Brazilian sources have 
become relatively less important compared to international sources over the last 
few years. 
• Partnership with local and international business. 
Armed violence and poverty in Rio de Janeiro, Richardson & Kirsten, March 2005 
 28
• Wide network of high level contacts within and outside Brazil. 
 
Challenges faced by Viva Rio which could be relevant to other 
organisations if they are looking to adopt a holistic approach: 
• In spite of the difficult situation in favelas due to control by drug factions, more 
emphasis could be placed on building on existing community structures and 
empowering partners at local level. 
• The evaluation of impact is currently weak, partly due to lack of resources. This is 
in the process of being strengthened with wider surveys of impact due to be 
commissioned. However, the often non-attributable nature of impacts to any one 
situation, project or organisation combined with the small-scale of some of the 
community interventions makes this a particularly challenging element but a vital 
part of any organisational strategy that seeks to address complex social issues such 
as violence reduction. 
 
 
Conclusions in relation to armed violence and poverty / social exclusion 
in Rio: 
• Rio is one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil. However the extreme inequality and 
social exclusion of a significant proportion of the population stands out as a major 
fault line and a cause of violence. 
• The presence of firearms, especially amongst drug traffickers in favelas is the 
biggest cause of firearm homicide.  
• The residents of favelas are stigmatised both in terms of location of residence and 
colour.  
• The favelas are illegal settlements which have made the state largely ignore them 
as areas of the city. This lack of state law has made them more susceptible to de 
facto control by drug factions, which in turn makes it harder for development to 
take place and limits outsiders entering whether these are businesses or 
development/violence control or prevention projects.   
• In terms of income, the residents of favela are not below the poverty line. 
However their relative poverty lies in their vulnerability and social exclusion.  
• 1995 figures show that the City of Rio spends 5 per cent of GDP on combating 
violence (excluding private security).  
• The most relevant MDG in relation to Rio is education (63 per cent of favela 
residents in the Municipality of Rio have not achieved their primary certificate – 
i.e. they have less than 8 years of education).  
• The culture of machismo creates a climate in which violence is seen as a norm, 
contributing to incidents of violence. This is evident in the prevalence of domestic 
violence against women and men’s desire to join drug gangs, seeing guns as a 
source of power and identity.  
• Favelas are often built on land which is environmentally protected which used to 
be forests. They are characteristically on steel slopes, above the city which makes 
them vulnerable to mud slides in heavy rain.  This adds to the legislative difficulty 
of granting the land to the residents legally.  
• Partnerships for development need to be built in the context of Brazil and Rio. An 
example of this is the multiple public security forces which do not have an 
integrated policy to combat violence.   
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Conclusions in relation to the links between poverty/ social exclusion 
and violence for Viva Rio (VR): 
• VR articulates well the links between reducing violence and increasing social 
inclusion and is trying to address both in practice. The levels of intervention are at 
community/ favela and municipal, state and federal levels. They are also 
researching these issues in Brazil and MERCOSUR together with other partners.   
• VR has shown the importance of understanding the complex reality of these 
interlinked phenomenon and the need to address them holistically. However not 
every project needs to address both issues.  
 
Conclusions in the differences and common grounds between 
development and small arms specialists: 
• Small arms research and SALW intervention projects often focus on the weapon 
as the entry point, whereas development practitioners tend to focus on people as 
the entry point. This contributes to the current gap between these two groups. The 
Rio and Viva Rio case study has shown that by focusing on both the weapon and 
those most affected by its misuse, thereby with the emphasis on people, this 
allows for greater opportunity for dialogues and partnership between SALW 
control and development practitioners in the more effective pursuit of the same 
outcomes. 
• These differences have implications for how the categorisation of comparable 
contexts occurs.  
  
Recommendations to AVPI: 
• Define clearly the types of armed violence which the case studies are addressing 
(e.g. urban violence; post-conflict violence and reintegration; etc) 
• This research project demonstrated the importance of understanding the broad 
contextual links between armed violence and poverty in order to more effectively 
assess the impact of SALW intervention projects. As a result of effectively 
combining these two dimensions of the AVPI global research project (as was done 
in the case of Rio), the recommendation is then to integrate these two dimensions 
in the final synthesis report.  
• A holistic approach is recommended in order to identify the root causes of poverty 
and violence, who are the victims and perpetrators of armed violence and why. 
Only then is it possible to see which project interventions are most relevant, and 
for which purpose. 
• Use of language and definitions is vital to clarify in the introduction to the 
synthesis of findings. If poverty is seen as synonymous with inequality and 
exclusion then urban violence is one of the dimensions of poverty. If it is seen 
purely in absolute and not relative terms, and from an income measure, then it is 
not possible to conclude from this case study that violence arises from poverty. 
However the poor, without coping mechanisms, are often worse affected by 
violence - economic, social, intimidation and fear – than those who can afford to 
protect themselves e.g. by hiring private security. The police are often more 
abusive to the poor as they have the least power to defend themselves. 
• There is a wealth of comparative research in relation to urban violence from a 
development perspective.  
• Using this research and the other relevant studies on this issue, next steps should 
be to develop context specific case studies of good practice. Stronger evaluation of 
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impact within projects would help to determine what strategies or combination of 
strategic interventions are most effective.  
 
Recommendations to government and donor policy makers: 
• There needs to be an integration of small arms reduction and development 
specialists, policy makers and practitioners. This can be done by understanding 
each others’ perspectives and starting from the common ground of analysing who 
is most affected by both poverty and armed violence.  
• There is a wealth of information on each issue which this research has contributed 
to. However, meetings between these two groups of donors, officials and 
practitioners should be a pre-requisite if development in areas of high armed 
violence is an objective.  
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Annex 1 – List of people interviewed 
 
Name Position Institution 
Rubem César 
Fernándes 
Director Viva Rio 
Jessica Galeria Translator Viva Rio 
Maria Helena 
Moreira Alves 
Coordinator of International 
Relations 
Viva Rio 
Marcelo de Sousa 
Nascimento 
Statistics ISER 
Ilona Szababó de 
Carvalho 
Institutional Relations, Public 








Veronica dos Anjos, 
Elizabeth Albernaz. 
GPAE/Community Policing. 
PROASP. Municipal public 
Safety Plans 
Viva Rio 
Teófilo Calvacanti Coordinator of Viva Cred Viva Cred 





Coordinator of Telecursos Viva Rio 
Pablo Gabriel 
Dreyfus 
Senior Researcher, Small Arms 
Control Project 
Viva Rio 
Luciana Phebo Researcher and Project 
Coordinator 
ISER 
Fernando Patiño Human Settlement Officer UN-Habitat 
Renata Bernardes Consultant Viva Santa, Agenda 21 
Local de Santa Teresa 
Dante Quinterno Director TV Roc and TV Favela 
Dr Bernardo Sorj Professor of Sociology Federal University of Rio 
de Janeiro (UFRJ) 
José Marcello 
Zacchi 





Coordinator of Monitoring ISER 
Ubiratan de Oliveira 
Angelo 
Colonel / GPAE Military Police of Rio de 
Janeiro 
Leila Lino PROASP – assistant on the 
youth at risk project 
Viva Rio 
Leriana Figueiredo Coordinator of Luta pela Paz Viva Rio 
Vitor Belo da Silva Manager Luta pela Paz Viva Rio 
Carlinhos Costa Coordinator of Public Security 
& Human Rights 
Viva Rio 
Rafael da Rocha 
Guimaraes 
Intern at Rocinha Future 
Station 
Viva Rio 
Josephine Bourgois Disarmament project Viva Rio 
Ben Lessing Senior researcher in 
Disarmament project 
Viva Rio 
Armed violence and poverty in Rio de Janeiro, Richardson & Kirsten, March 2005 
 32
Name Position Institution 
Bernice van 
Bronkhorst 
World Bank  
Emmanuel Rodrigo 
Pereira; Alexandra 
Paula Alves; Luiz de 
Carvalho. 
Civil Voluntário Citizens Council, 
Resende/Conselho Cidadão 
e Serviço 
José Roberto Pereira 
Sampais 
Vice- President of the Conselho 
and Chemical Workers Union 
(Sindicato dos Quimicos do sul 
Flumiunse) 
Conselho Cidadão e Serviço 
Eleides Rubert President of Local Area One. Conselho Cidadão e Serviço 
Kleber Luis de 
Sousa 
Ismar Costa e Silva 
Carlos Eduardo dos 
Santos 
Procurador Jurídico Municipal 
Monitoring section 
Civil Municipal Guard, 
Resende 
Eduardo Mehoas Mayor Mayors Office, Resende 
Dra. Tânia Tereza 
Medeiros Carvalho 
Coordinator of the Resende 
Public Order Plan - Mayors 
office 
Prefeitura de Resende 
Bruno Vaz  Sasson Secretary of Safety, Transport 
and Traffic 





Debora da Paz 
Perliera 
 
Orientadora de Aprendizagem 
Jerusa 
Prefectura de Resende 
Carolina Carvalho 
Cacador; Tatiana S. 
Carvalho Alvarenga 
Advocate; intern advocate Balcão de Directos, 
Resende (Citizens Rights 
Counter) 
Monica Nascimento Municipal Public plan Viva Rio 










Commandant of the Municipal 
Guards 
Resende 
Kleber Luis de 
Sousa 
Procurador Jurídico Municipal 
– Municipal Guards 
Resende 
Ismar Costa e Silva Monitor – Municipal Guards Resende 
María Lucia 
Camargo 
Victim - domestic viólence & 
recipient of services 
CAMUR 
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Name Position Institution 
Ariele Asarecida de 
Paula 
Student Tele-sala - Novo Surubi 
Daiana de Freitas Student Tele-sala - Novo Surubi 
E.M. Maria Dulce Teacher Tele-sala - Novo Surubi 
Itamar Silva Community development 
worker 
IBASE 
Alba Zaluar Independent researcher  




Maria da Graça 
Ribeiro das Neves; 
Rosimere de Souza 
Local governance, gender, 
organisation and management; 
human rights 
Brazilian Institute of 
Municipal Administration 
(IBAM) 
Michel Misse Dept. of sociology  Federal University of Rio 
Thais Corral General Coordinator Human Development 
Network 
Ignacio Cano Professor dept of Social 
Sciences 




Coordinator of  Municipal 
Public Safety Plan 
Viva Rio 
Patricia Rivero Sociologist and researcher in 
ISER and Disarmament project 
ISER 
Virgínia Garcez Manager of programme People who make peace 
(Gente  faz paz) 
Sue Fleming (via 
telephone) 
Social Development Advisor DFID, Brasilia 
Aurélio Mesquita Participant in Viva Cred 
programme 
Rocinha 
Luke Dowdney Researcher and coordinator of 
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ANNEX 3: Development Assistance Funding for Brazil 
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ANNEX 4: Cost of Violence in Rio 
 
US$ million 
City of Rio de Janeiro per year 2, 058.2
City GDP, 1995  43,039.0
Health costs and years of life lost due to 
premature death or disability 
801.8
1. Direct medical costs  31.6
2. Cost of years lost due to premature 
death 
770.1
3. Cost of years lost due to disability  0.04
B. Material losses and security costs  1,256.4
1. Gross social costs  571.4
1.1  Costs of public security  489.5
1.2  Costs of justice (1.2.1 + 1.2.2)  81.9
1.2.1  Court system   58.8
1.2.2  Penal system  23.2
1.3  Costs of private security   Not estimated
1.4  Effects on private investments and 
growth            
Not estimated
2. Social transfers  684.9
2.1  Insurance   542.9
2.1.1   Life and hospitalization   30.8
2.1.2   Protection of goods  512.1
2.2  Direct material losses  142.0
 
 
Source: Leandro Piquet Carneiro and Luciana Phebo, ISER (1998) in a comparative 
international research conducted by IDB 
Note: Private security and economic impacts such as tourism and in real state values 
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Useful web sites 
 
Viva Rio: http://www.vivario.org.br/ 
Viva Rio Projects:  
• Children in Armed Violence Project: http://www.coav.org.br/ 
• Favela radio: http://www.vivafavela.com.br/ 
• Disarmament Programme: http://www.desarme.org 
• Fight for Peace: http://www.lutapelapaz.org.br 




Mayor’s office, Rio de Janeiro: http://www.armazemdedados.rio.rj.gov.br 
